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Views on Monetary Policy
HE IDEAL MONETARY POLICY requires a credible and predictable commitment to maintain the long-term purchasing power of a currency. The performance of central banks, which have traditionally been entrusted with monetary policymaking, is far from this ideal simply because a clear mandate for price-level stability-zero inflation-is absent. In practice, central banks serve as instruments that governments use to pursue multiple objectives that they believe serve their interests. Therefore central banks pursue monetary policies that at best have only a fragile commitment to price stability. Governments are currently pursuing policy coordination or monetary union strategies that are little more than attempts to implement a regime of monetary protectionism, in the global economy. The future of monetary policy rests on the continuing struggle between politicians seeking policies that serve their short-term agendas and global financial markets that limit the actions of an individual central bank.
In my remarks I discuss why central banks have been established, their bias toward inflation and the importance of independence and accountability to their effectiveness. 1 also argue that zero inflation should be the dominant objective of a central bank and that current efforts to coordinate monetary policies are likely to conflict with that objective.
WHY CENTRAL BANKS?
What is the justification for a central bank? Can some configuration of private institutions in a so-called free-banking environment perform the functions of a government-sponsored monetary authority? Are central banks necessary?
In his 1959 Millar Lectures at Fordham University, Milton Friedman provided a classic statement of the economic rationale for central banks.' Friedman's argument appealed fundamentally to the costs inherent in a pure commoditystandard system, for example, a gold-standard system. These costs arise both from pure resource costs and perhaps more significantly from substantial short-run price variability resulting from inertia in the adjustment of commodity-money supply to changes in demand. The inefficiencies these costs represent are a significant disadvantage of commodity-money exchange systems.
As a consequence there is a natural tendency, borne out by history, for pure commodity standards to be superseded by fiat money. But particular aspects of fiat money systems-such as fraudulent banking practices, natural monopoly characteristics and tendencies for localized banking failures to spread to the financial system as a whole-resulted in the active participation of government. We have come to know this active participation as central banking.
Rationales for establishing central banks have not gone unchallenged, not even by Friedman.' Disruptions in payments can be costly, but so are the instabilities and inefficiencies caused by the lack of an effective anchor for the price level in fiat money systems. Moreover, 'theoretical discoveries in finance and monetary economics, closer attention to the lessons of lustorical banking arrangements and advances in infot-mation and financial technologies have contributed to a healthy skepticism about the supeiiority of central banks and government regulation to alternative market arrangements. For example, some of the financial-backstop functions performed by central banks and banking regulators may have weakened private market incentives to control and protect against risk.'
Stilt, those who argue for alternative monetary structures must at least recognize that their case rests on untested propositions. Yes, it would be wrong to accept unthinkingly our current central banking system as the best alternative for performing the monetary functions of advanced economies, but it would also be wiong to claim that the current central banking system does not reflect society's choice of an institutional arrangement to perform those functions.
It is not sufficient to argue that marketoriented alternatives to oui current central banking systems functioned better in other times and places, for example, in 18th-century Scotland.
4 This begs the question of why such a system did not prove to be sustainable. Nor is it sufficient to argue that this system would have prevailed if not for government intervention arid interference. This line of debate fails to consider whether a political equilibrium that would support a market-oriented system in an advanced economy exists anywhere.
It is premature to claim that some hypothetical monetary system can or should dominate institutional arrangements that have already evolved from extended political and economic experience. I believe that the prudent first course is to con-sider the advantages of improving the performance of central banks. The benefits of a properly managed fiat currency are considerable, and the issue is or should be how to provide the central bank with a proper charter to ensure policy action that generates price-level stability in the long term. If such efforts fail, market alternatives should be sought.
Because I am most familiar with the Federal Reserve, let me use it as an example. Before the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the country prospered without a central batik. Broadly speaking, the impetus for creating the Federal Reserve was a series of banking panics that led to contractions in money and credit that in turn caused serious disruptions in economic activity. The nation sought to improve its banking system by establishing a means for providing an elastic money in the context of a monetary standard based on full convertibility to gold. The gold link was severely weakened by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.
The Federal Reserve was the result of a compromise between those who would have kept the banking system entirely private and those who wanted government to assume a prominent role in a rapidly growing economy. Other nations have grappled with the same problems and created similar institutions. Today many republics of the former Soviet Union and several eastern European nations are facing these same issues. We now have a world monetary system in which governments, through central banks, monopolize the supply and management of inconvertible fiat monies.
The displacement of the commodity standard that prevailed at the time the Federal Reserve was founded has exposed problems not otherwise envisioned in 1913. For example, the price level has no anchor except fot that provided by the resolve of Federal Reserve policymakers. The quadrupling of prices since 1950 dramatically demonstrates the failure of Federal Reserve policymakeis to provide such an anchor for the monetary exchange system. Fed policymakers' commitment to price stability is neither as explicit nor as strong as necessary for the successful management of a fiat currency. The gradual demise of our convertible monetary standard has brought us to a point that requires a basic 'See Friedman and Schwartz (1986) 'See Goodhart (1988). change to the framework within which the Federal Reserve functions if the benefits of a fiat currency are to be achieved without large offsetting costs.
The evolution of the global monetary system reflects a common, though unstated, acknowledgment that the benefits of a fiat monetary standard are substantial. Wise administration of that standard requires a central bank in some capacity. In this context, the essential issue is this: How can nations achieve the benefits of a fiat money standard and simultaneously consti-ain the exercise of that power to the service of the public good? Put another way: How can a nation prevent its central bank from debasing the monetary standard it is charged to protect?
INFLATIONARY BIAS OF CENTRAL

BANKS
The answer to these questions seems to elude us. Witness the universal debasement of currencies by central banks since the loss of a commodity standard as a price-level anchor. To find the answer, we must review central bank charters and the incentives provided to those who control monetary printing presses. public-choice economists have focused on this issue and developed a rich literature; however, I feel they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the secular bias toward inflation among central banks (with different charters and varying degrees of independence from political influence). Moreover, this approach fails to explain why in earlier periods governments did not consistently exploit the opportunities to inflate by realigning their currencies against gold or dropping their convertibility -Another explanation br persistent inflation that iìas some appeal is policy mistakes, or inappropriate tat-gets or operating procedures of central banks. This explanation also leaves some unanswered questions. Why aren't policy mistakes symmetrical? That is, why don't they cause defiations as well as inflations, leaving the average pt-ice level unchanged over time? Perhaps policy mistakes are biased toward inflation because of the operating procedures employed, such as interest rate targeting. Yet the Bundesbank, which uses monetary aggregate targets, produces a rising price level. The Bank of Japan uses interest rate targets and has generated a similar increase in its price level during the past two decades. If a central batik is dedicated to price-level stability over time, the choice of targets or operating procedures probably only influences the variability of inflation rates around a zero mean. In short, a central bank that truly wants to achieve pricelevel stability can do it with any number of operating techniques, as long as they control money growth over time.
Perhaps a simple, and less elegant, explanation for persistent inflation is that central bankers are suffering from a Keynesian hangover. Centi-al hankers, politicians and the public are merely reflecting the prevailing economic dogma that government has the responsibility and ability to manage aggregate output and employment, as well as inflation. I have argued and continue to believe that a major source of price-level instability comes from multiple objectives assigned to central banks-economic growth, employment, price stability and exchange rates. It is true that politicians pressure central banks to achieve different objectives at different times. Such political pressure can produce inappropriate policy actions; however, the responsibility for assigning multiple objectives to central banks rests as much with the economics professions as it does with politicians. For the last 50 years, many economists have supported various theories of business-cycle management, which required that central banks shift from one objective to another. Today businessmen, politicians and most econormusts continue to believe that if the economy is weak, the central batik should respond regardless of the cause of the weakness. And so it does.
Some of the current discussions about monetary policy and the Federal Reserve suggest that the lessons of the 1970s may he fading from out-memories. Calls for lower interest rates or more rapid money growth are not at all unusual. More often than not, those suggestions seem impelled by desires for growth or desires to offset the problems of particular sectors of the economy. They seem based on the notion that there is a trade-off between inflation arid output or between inflation and employment that can be exploited by the central bank. Some of us learned from the experience of the 1970s that such a trade-off does not occur over time. Instead, higher inflation only added to uncertaints', distorted resource allocation and reduced economic performance below the maximum sustamable level with price stability.
Members of a central batik policy committee such as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reflect what is believed by the mainstream.
In January 1990 the National Association of Business Economists surveyed its members and asked the following question: Is reducing the inflation rate to zero over the next five years the appropriate objective of monetary policy?" More than 80 percent of the respondents answered no. Their responses indicate that they believe the FOMC should trade off inflation for some other objective, presumably economic growth At about the same time, the House Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy surveyed 500 members of the American Economics Association who list monetary economics as either their first or second specialty. The unpublished survey shows that only a slight majority of those who responded favored zero inflation over the next five years.
I believe that much of the inflationary bias of central banks over the past 50 years reflects the prevailing view that output and employment fluctuations can be smoothed with monetary policy. Currently, before each FOMC meeting, members of the Committee are presented with the policy views of several prominent economists. Either explicitly or implicitly, these views invariably present the policy choice in terms of a Phillips curve trade-off. Staff projections at the FOMC meeting also imply such a trade-off, as do the statements by some FOMC members. Moreover, policy actions, such as a reduction in the federal funds rate, often follow the release of employment or output statistics, further reinforcing the notion that the F'ederal Reserve can manage real variables. To the extent that this explanation of central bank behavior is valid, inflationary bias will not be eliminated until there is agreement within the profession on price-level stability as the dominant objective for central banks.
INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
The problems that emanate ftom multiple, and often incompatible, objectives are well known. To conttibute to maximum economic growth over time, central banks must achieve price-level stability. Achieving this goal requires that central banks be free from political expediencies-that is, that they have independence within government. Substantial evidence indicates a link between central-bank independ-ence and the ability to achieve price stability. Recent studies show that countries that grant their central banks the greatest degree of independence have had the lowest rates of inflation.8 Even taking into account other sociopolitical factors that might cause inflationary pressures, the degree of central-bank independence appears to have an important effect on a country's inflation rate. However, with independence must come accountability. Even the clearest objectives will prove elusive without accountability; independence without direct accountability is a dangerous brew for those who drink it. Great harm has come from well-intentioned, independent central bankers with little or no accountabilitywitness the United States in the 1930s. Many mechanisms exist today to bring accountability to central banking; for example, the employment contract of the governor of the central bank of New Zealand contains a price-stability requirement.
The objectives, degree of independence, and accountability of the central bank are substantially determined by its legal structure. For example, a clear legislative directive to achieve price-stability goals above all others and the freedom to pursue price-stability initiatives would all but eliminate potential conflict with other objectives. The vexing question of what extent, if any, a central bank should compromise the price-stability objective to pursue auxiliary goals, such as smoothing real output fluctuations or stabilizing exchange rates, should be resolved and dictated in the legislative charter. True independence and strict accountability can be attained only legislatively.
Compared with the central banks of other countries, the Federal Reserve System has a better structure to execute monetary policy effectively; however, the Fed is not as well positioned as other central banks. The Federal Reserve is charged with multiple objectives that are often incompatible but that at least include price stability. It is functionally independent within government, but it faces intermittent challenges to its autonomy. Its independence comes from both its charter and its practice. lndependence is essentially a delineation between the responsibilities of Congress and the executive branch on one side and the monetary 'See NABE Policy Survey (1990) .
6 See Alessina (1988) and Banaian (1983) . authority on the other to limit the motive and means to debase the value of the nation's money.
'~"he~~source of tension between monetary and fiscal authorities is the central bank's ability to create money. Because the creation of fiat money imposes an implicit tax on money balances, the monetary authority is one source of government revenues. For the most part, the long-run viability of the government's fiscal operations requires that its real current debt burden plus the present value of its expenditures equal the present value of revenues. Thus if the path of debt plus expenditures diverges from the path of explicit tax revenues, fiscal viability requires that the discrepancy he satisfied by seigniorage from monetary growth. This scenario is typically referred to as fiscal dominance over the monetary authority.
The original Federal Reserve charter left many doors open for the executive branch to influence monetary policy. These were partially closed when the Banking Act of 1935 removed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of Cvrrency from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In addition, the law established the FOMC, with the seven governors and five of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents as voting members, ensuring that power within the Federal Reserve would be shared between political appointees and regional hank presidents. Thus the fire wall that made the Federal Reserve, and not the executive branch, responsible for monetary policy objectives was reinforced. It was strengthened further by the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which served as a clear statement that the Fed would not he coerced into solving the federal government's debt-management problems. The institutional structure was designed to ensure enough Fecletal Reserve independence within the government to carry out this mandate without interference.
This independence in principle has held up in practice. 'The dramatic increases in federal deficits in the early-and mid-1980s prompted fiscal dominance believers to predict that it would be impossible to achieve and maintain inflation rates below the disastrous levels of the decade's start. So far, this prediction has not come to pass. In 1983 the federal budget deficit was 3.8 percent of GNP, a level far above the post-World War II aver-age and nearly equal to the postwar peak realized in 1975. In the same year, inflation measured by the consumer price index fell to 3.2 percent-a 16-year low. As the decade proceeded, the deficit relative to GNP rose, fell, and rose again to its present level above S percent. The inflation rate was impervious to these patterns.
Astute observers might question the melevance of the early-and mid-1980s to the fiscal dominance proposition, because deficits as they are conventionally measured do not necessarily reflect the government's long-run fiscal operations. To name just a few of the problems, the value of longrun government net liabilities is inherently ambiguous, the path of future revenues is uncertain and the appmopriate method of discounting future tax and expenditure flows is problematic. Although sympathetic to this view, I am still left with the strong suspicion that if any period in recent history was ripe for the emergence of fiscal dominance, it was the last 10 years.
Indeed, as the decade progressed and the predictions of the fiscal-dominance theory failed to materialize, more sophisticated variants of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy began to find their way into economic research. The fiscal authority's reign over the subservient monetary authority was replaced by a more subtle and complicated institutional structure, a world in which fiscal and monetary authorities played a game of chicken, the outcome of which left both parties less than fully satisfied.~Although deficits may be detrimental to economic performance, the ability of the Federal Reserve to resist monetizing debt has protected the economy from even worse consequences. The Federal Reserve's decision to resist monetizing the federal debt resulted in loiver inflation and contributed to fiscal reforms that started with the Gramm-Rudrnan-Hoilings legislation.
In my view the Federal Reserve has sufficient independence to achieve pm-ice stability. The coreproblerri, however, is that the Federal Reserve is not accountable for that objective. Without accountability, the policy process will be neither credible nor predictable. The more credible the commitment to the policy goal, the fewer wrong decisions will be made by the markets. The more predictable the policy reaction to unforeseen economic events, the more limited will be the market reaction to those events. Credibility and ptedictahility can substantially lower the costs 'See Sargent (1985) . of achieving and maintaining a stable price level. Yet with the disintegration of the monetary aggregates as intermediate policy guides, discretionary monetary policy actions may seem especially hard to predict because policy objectives and accountability for' them are unclear. The existing policy process, with its focus on short-term economic or financial developments does not provide credibility.
How can we change the process to reinforce the cm-edibility of a consistent goal? I think the most secure way would be to give the FOMC a legislative mandate to meet a consistent, attainable and unchanging economic goal. Passage of House Joint Resolution 409, introduced by Representative Stephen Neal, would pmovide that crucial reinforcement. The Neal resolution simply directs the Federal Reserve to make price stability the primary goal of monetary policy and to achieve that goal within five year-s. History gives us little basis for expecting price stability or' even a stable rate of inflation because the FOMC has had no mandate to produce that result. Giving the FOMC that mandate and knowing that the FOMC intended to stabilize the inflation rate at zero, would provide one gigantic piece of policy informatiomi to any rational decision-maker-in any dollar-denominated market. The Federal Reserve would remain independent, and it would retain complete discretion about how to carry out policy. The only change would be that Congress would provide more direction about the basic policy objective, and the Federal Reserve would be accountable for achieving it. True accountability would also require an incentive or enforcement mechanism for achieving the objective.
The FOMC can deliver lower inflation without a legislative mandate. Of that you should have no doubt! Inflation is a monetary phenomenon, and the FOMC is the sole custodian of the quantity of money in the United States. If a zeroinflation mandate were in effect, short-term deviations from zero inflation might occur, but one way or another the FOMC could provide a stable price environment. As niany scholars have urged, the FOMC might impose accountability on itself by tying policy actions to some intermediate target variable by an agreed-on formula that would ensure price stability. These days, the most popular candidates for an intermediate policy target seem to he nominal GDP and M2, either of which is thought capable of producing reasonable price stability. Another approach would be for the Committee to specify achieving the ultimate policy goal as the rule, while using discretion in choosing actions to achieve the goal.
Of course having today's FOMC impose accountability on itself (by adopting an explicit rule tying an instrument to a goal) is not a foolproof way to achieve an official policy goal. Credibility would have to be earned through predictable actions consistent with the goal. To adopt an explicit rule, at least a majority of today's FOMC members must not only agree on an overriding macroeconomic goal, but also renounce some discretion to pursue other goals. Moreover, tomorrow's FOMC could decide to change the goal and hence the rule. In the current policy regime, today's policy choice can in no way bind tomorrow's. Unless directed by society through specific mandate, tomorrow's FOMC always has the discretion to change the goal. And with shifting goals there is no accountability. I believe that the lack of accountability for a dominant policy goal of price stability is the major cause of the inflationary bias in the U.S. economy since World War II.
Although the specifics of the Federal Reserve charter differ from those of other central banks, the problems of comiflicting objectives and the lack of secure independence and explicit accountability are common to all central banks in varying degrees. Experience around the world and through time repeatedly demonstrates that cential banks require independence from day-today political life to perform their price-stability role. If we could create legal and cultural conditions that truly fix a central batik with accountability for anchoring the price level, the structure of the central bank itself would become less important. Those circumstances would be a joy to behold, but I am afraid they will be some time in coming.
WHY A ZERO4NFLATION OBJECTIVE?
I stmomigly believe for three reasons that the dominant objective of monetary policymakers should be price stability. First, in the long run, a central hank can control the price level of goods and services denominated in its own curiemicy, hut it cannot control the growth of output (potential or actual). Second, a credible commitment to a price-stability objective enables a central bank to piomote economic efficiency FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOWS and growth (potential and actual). Third, price. level stability, popularly called zero inflation, is superior-to inflation-rate stability.
Among economists, support for' the fir-st reason is nearly universal. There is also widespread agreement on the second point. A central bank that pur'sues price stability promotes economic efficiency and growth. I would venture further to say that experience shows that central banks that have sought to enhance economic growth directly have failed miserably at providing stable price levels and ironically have undercut economic growth in the process. The last reason-that rio inflation is prefer~ihleto stable, non-zero inflation-is most contentious, particularly when people attempt to compare the transitional costs of achieving price stability with the costs of stabilizing the inflation rate at the status quo.
The argument that the cost of pursuing a zeroinflation target would outweigh the benefit of reaching that target has two dimensions. The first is that the benefit of achieving zero inflation would he small. The second deals with the costs of moving from a 4 percent trend rate of inflation to zero inflation. This is the transition-cost argument, which essentially says that even if zero is the place to be, getting there is riot worth the ride. I believe that the benefits of zero inflatiomi are great and that the transition costs can he reduced if the Federal Reserve commits to an explicit plan for achieving zero inflation.
The interaction between inflation and our current tax system, especially as it applies to income generated by capital, represents one of the mnore significant channels through which non-zero inflation can exact economic costs.' This channel of distortiomi is often not taken seriously because people think that its effects are minimal or that it would be easy to index the tax system. Correcting the tax code is a good idea of course, but until that happens, what possible excuse is there for not letting the monetary authorities do what is necessary to improve 5OciLil welfare?
It is clear that the horrendous U.S. inflationan' experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s created the impetus for the limited inflation indexation of the current tax system; however, the job is far from complete. Capital gains, corporate depreciation and interest expenses, and personal interest income remain untouched by efforts to index the tax system for inflation. Even the bracket indexation implemented by recent tax reform does not fully protect taxpayers from bracket creep, or nonlegislated increases in marginal tax rates created by inflation. Complete indexation of the tax code, however desirable it may be, will be extremely difficult to achieve. Will another inflationary experience like that of the 1 970s be required to induce further progress on tax indexation? I fail to understand why some feel that these inflation-tax interactions are a significant drag on the economy, yet argue that only Congress should be concerned with the problem. The prob-1cm exists because of the interactions between inflation amid a tax systetn based in current dollars. Therefore it seems that the responsibility for minimizing these costs lies as much with the monetary authorities as with Congress. Doesn't it make more sense for monetary authorities to try to correct the inflation part of the problem rather than simply hoping that Congress will implement changes that it may he unable or unwilling to pursue? We speak about the costs of achieving zero inflation, but what about the costs of fully indexing the tax system? Surely they would he significant.
Another area of concern is the role of uncertainty as a source of inflation costs. How important at-c the distortions that arise from pt-ice-level uncertainty? There is a class of models-the market-clearing, imperfect-information paradigm associated with Robert Lucas and others-in which inflation uncertainty harms the economy by distorting the period-to-period relative price signals that facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce resources.' Despite the pervasive intellectual influence exerted by the I ucas framework to this day, the empirical evidence accumulated since the development of the paradigm in the early 1970s has not been entirely supportive. This point is not lost on critics, who think that the lack of eyidence on short-term distortions should persuade us that inflation uncertainty is simply not that important to social welfare. Surel the relative-price/aggregate-price confusion stressed by the Lucas-type models isa special type of uncertainty. 'I'he failure to find significant effects from uncertaint that is resolved within a few quarters tells us next to nothing about the type of long-run uncertainty with which the zero-inflation position has always been fundamentally concerned.
'See Altig and Carlstrom (1990) .
'See Lucas (1972) .
Indeed, it seems likel that the uncertainty occurring over exLended time horizons is precisely what is most affected by the average inflation rate.'' This is one reason why I favor a price-level tam'get. An imiflation-rate tam-get enahles the price level to drift without bound, and with no enforcement mechanism to ensure that inflation mistakes will be corrected, the longrun variance of the price level is infinite. When people have reason to believe that this standard will erode over time, they invest miujmiemous resources to protect themselves. Those who have nominal debt outstanding will drag their feet in paying it hack, whereas cm-editors will invest in ways to accelerate the collection of funds. 'The private gains to self-protection are clear, as ar-c the social costs.
Recent experience is the best testimony to the real resource cost of inflation. During the I 9705, people could see that inflation accelerated each year. The~'guessed, reasonably at the time, that financial assets had limited value in protecting their wealth from inflation. Consequently, farmland, commercial and residential property, and precious metals became much more expensive as people sought to shelter their wealth. Not only was time spent seeking these investmnemits, which was socially wasteful, hut also the resource misallocation itself resulted in a great waste of land, labor and capital that society is still paving for' today.
It is difficult to comprehend how elficiemit p1ann~m~g within the public and private sector-s could not be inhibited liv this type of long-run uncertainty. Furthermore, the intuition that longrun inflation uncertainty is costl\' has empirical suppor't. In cross-country compar-isons, economic growth is negatively retated to the variability of inflation. One finds that the case for reducing price level uncertainty is far more compelling than a cursory analysis might indicate.
In evaluating the costs of attaining zero inflation, economists almost always use morlels in which markets do riot clear' or do not clear without cost. Cone is the market-clearing, flexible-price, r'ationat-expectations model. In its place is a model with pm'ice conti-acts that make the tm'ansition to zero inflation extremely costly. 'I'he source of the friction is usually riot entirely explicit, hut the implication is I hat we must assume some frictions. These frictions, coupled with the inability of markets to clear, mnake ending inflation appear as costly as it does.
Isn't it sensible to assume that the implicit sources of frictions that make lowering the inflation rate costly would also con tr'ibute to making inflation costl in and of itself? For instance, a variety of explicit and implicit nominal contr'acts alm'eady exist, and a transition to zero inflation could alter the real values of payments from those that were originally intended. But surely the entire institutional apparatus that generates these contracts must involve resource costs that are positively related to the average i-ate of inflation.
One should not compare the costs of achieving zero inflation in non-market-clearing models, where such costs are high, to the benefits of being at zero inflation in frictionless, continuously clearing models, whet-c the bemiefits are low. tf we use a model with frictions to measure the cost of getting to zero inflation, then we should also use such a model to examine the benefits of being there. This is one reason I am skeptical of so many' cost/benefit estimates of reducing inflation. I am also skeptical about tramisition-cost estimates that do not account for the possibility that a price-stability objective will be r'egarded as credible by the public. Ecomiomic theory and reasonable model simulations persuade me to believe that with credible precommitnient, a central hank cami greatly minimize private-sector planning errors during the transition pem'iod. I think that much of the disagreement among economists on the size of transition costs centers on the ability of a central bank to commit itself credibly to achieving its objective. Until I see some hard evidence to dissuade mile, I plan to continue my advocacy of price stability as the overriding objective of eemitr'al banks.
It still puzzles mne that volumes of research have been publisbed on central bank operating pr'ocedures arid management of monetary aggregates, yet relatively little m'esear'ch has been published on the value of a credible precor~imnitmnentto a price-stability objective. Mv intuition tells me that the latter is far more important than the former in terms of economic welfare. Of course, credihility depends on policy information avail-"See Ball and Cecchetti (1990) . "See Grier and Tutlock (1989) and Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1990) FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS able to market participants so that they can monitor pm-ogress toward the objective.
One major benefit of imposing an explicit intention on monetan' policy is that policy actiomis in the money market would become far less momentous than they are now. Currently, detecting a change in the federal funds rate target from the pattern of open market opem'ations is crucial because it provides markets with one of the few clues as to what monetary policy the Federal Reserve is nwsuing. Canvassing the positions of individual FOMC members is a way of predicting futum'e polic. If policy intent were explicit and credible, however, finding the clues in open market opem-ations would have less significance. 1 see the greatest payoff in more inforniation about policy intentions. An explicit FOMC commitrmment to pr-ice stability would allow markets to shift resources fromn watching the Federal Reserve to watching the economy for productive investment opportunities -Focusing on the intent of policy contrasts markedly with conventional concerns for more certainty about the current degree of reserve restraint. There are many ways to reduce uncertainty about the iriimediate funds-rate implications of policy, just as there are many time schedules by which the FOI'vIC directive might he released. More certainty about the immediate policy implications of the federal funds rate i-night make Fed-watching a bit easier, but it would riot dlo much to help identify policy intentions hevond short horizons. Releasing Fed directives eam'l~'might provide a slightly hr-ighter glimmer of policy intentions, but only for a slightly longer policy horizon. We do not need better' information about the latest directive; we need better-information about the process through which all future directives will be crafted-that is, policy imitentions. Nothing would prot'ide more insight than a clearly stated goal
MONETARY POLICY AND MONETARY PROTECTIONISM
Let me turn now to the effects of interriational policy coordination on the pmmrsuit of zero inflation.12 Exchange-r'ate regimnes and attempts at nionetam'y union are currently undermining the price-stability objective. Many actions taken by central banks are not aimed at price stability, hut rather are attempts to establish monetary protectionism. B monetary pm'otectionism, I m'efer to attempts to alter real exchange rates thm-ough manipulation of monetary policies and with the hope of ultimately promoting a balance-ofpaymemits objective. In the case of a deficit country, monetary protectionists call for an expansion of money growth (om' lower miominal inter~estrates). A monetary expansion, other tlnngs being equal, will produce a nominal depreciation. If iridiyiduals are unable to adjust prices immediately, or if they are slow in perceiving the inflationary aspects of this policy, a real depreciation will accompany the nominal depreciation. As most economists realize, however', the inflation rate will eventually respond to the monetary expamision, offsetting the nominal depreciation and ret um-ning the real exchange rate to its initial position. Nevem'theless, the tenuous, short-lived relationship between money and the real exchange rate is seductive enough to convince politicians amid other fine-tuners that monetary policy can serve mnercantilist designs.
My focus on this issue stems from a firm belief that central banks can do no better than guarantee long-run price stability and that any efforts to limnit this guarantee ar'e not likely to raise world welfare. Central banks can juggle a real exchange rate and inflation target no better than they can slide back and forth along a stable Phillips cut-ye. A central bank that attempts to maintain price~~stability and a nominal exchange rate tam-get has more policy targets than policy instruments. At times, these two objectives might he compatible. For example, in the late t970s, limiting rapid dollar depr'eciation through intervention could have been conipatible with a conractionary monetary policy to eliminate inflation. As often as riot, howeyer, these two policy objectives will be incompatible, amid the central bank must trade one objective for the other. tinder such conditions, markets will view neither' price stability nor exchange-rate stability as a credible policy. The knowledge that central banks will deviate fr'omn a policy of pm-ice stahilitt' to pursue an exchange r'ate objective will raise uncertainty about real returns and will distort the allocation of resources across sectors and through time. The resources dlevoted to protecting wealth fr-or-n possihle inflation could l2This section summarizes ideas presented in Hoskings and Humpage (1990) .
he applied to more productive uses under a policy of price stability. Moreover, attempts to maintain nominal exchange rates will not eliminate exchange rate uncertainty because countries will inevitably resort to periodic exchange-rate realignments. Hedging exchange risk will remain an important aspect of international commerce.
Although monetary protectionism seems most prevalent under the present system of floating exchange rates, it does not follow that floating exchange rates promote its use. Monetary protectiotnsm can result any time a govem'nnient accepts nonmarket criteria for exchange rates. Imi principle, a gold standard or a fixed exchange rate regime can limit the scope of monetary protectionism because, if all countries play by the rules of the game, they link money supplies closely to the flow of international reserves. In pr-actice, however, such regimes do not destroy the political motives for monetary protectionism, and examnphes of monetary protectionism under fixed exchange rates abound. By allowing some discretion in the choice of exchange m~ateadjustments, fixed exchange m'ate m'eginies often produce a mechanism that weakens the allocative efficiency of exchange markets and promotes rnercantilist objectives.
In contrast to the inten'entionist literature, tyhich presupposes an all-wise govem'nment acting in the public's best interest, a rich, growing literature on political economy cham-acterizes elected officials as seeking to enhance their own power, prestige and wealth by maximizing their ability to gain votes. Politicians amid bureaucrats attempt to extend the scope of their influence by responding to the demands of the most politically active constituencies, '~A lioliticil justificatiomi for exchange rate manipulation is that it defers criticism and postpones niore fundamental actions. For instance, in 1985 dollar exchange rates were at their zenith, the U.S. current account was detem-iorating rapidly and evidence suggested that the t/nited States was becoming a debtor country for the first time since %'Vomld War I. U.S. manufacturers, facing increasingly stiff competition worldwide, besieged Comigress for trade legislation. Most impot-tant, analysts increasingly linked the deterioration in the external accounts with the fiscal policies of the Reagami Administration and Congress. The opportunity cost of government inaction, measured in terms of votes lost, seemed to m'ise sharply in the early i980s.
The U.S. current account deficit reflected imbalances between savings and investment in the United States, West Germany and Japan. Politicians, however, cannot easily redress such structum-al relationships through fiscal policies because of strong vested interests in maimitairnng various tax and expemiditum-e patterns. Umiable to address these structural problems directly and quickly, policymakers might resort to exchangemarket imitervention. When coordinated through the Group of Seven, such intervention offers a highly visible signal that governments are responding to the desires of theim constituemicies.'Ẽ xchange rate policies can also offer temporary benefits to specific constituencies. When goods prices are slow to adjust, a nonunal currency depreciation is equivalent to a temporary, across-the-board tax on imports and a subsidy to expor-ts. With the terms of trade temporarily altered, certain gm-oups mi the traded-goods sectors can realize benefits fmomn monetary protectionism similar to those afforded by more traditional forms of protectionism. Ultimnately, any benefits from monetary protectionism dissipate with a high inflation rate and with reduced credibility of monetary policy. The inflation costs of monetary protectionism, hotvet'em', are dispersed across a wider spectrum of individuals and over a longer time horizon than the benefits. A constituency that m'eceives net benefits from monetary protectionism (export-and import-competing firms) can exist. Such a constituency is likely to he niore politicably cohesive than any coristituency for price stability. Consequently, a policy that seemns myopic fromn an econonnc perspective can be politically attractive.
Another seemimigly attractive aspect of monetars' protectionnsni is that Congress and the admninistration can justify it in terms of broader macroeconomnic considerations, such as exchange rate misalignment or cut-remit account innhalamice, instead of industry-specific considerations, such as automobile mmd steel employment. Consequently, the rent-seeking aspects of monetars' protectionism am-c less obvious than those of standard protectionist policies.
"See Quibria (1989) "The Group of Seven countries are Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Countries interested in establishing exchange rate targets have a strong incentiye to collude in their efforts with foreign governments." In the case where countries attempt to alter nominal exchange rates, such collusion provides tacit for'eign approval of these policies arid linnts the chances that a foreign goyernment will take steps to neutralize the exchange policies of another government. Sometimes such collusion involves having cartel mnemhem~s delay policy negotiations, or exchange rate adjustments, when indiyidual cartel members face critical electiomis. Bnetton Woods and the Eumopean Monetary System (EMS) are examples of collusion that were fairly successful for a period. 'rhe competitive currency devaluations of the 1930s show what can happen when governments attempt to fix a price but thieir cartel breaks down. Coordinated efforts to fix exchange rates can allow individual countries to influence the policies of others and to defer some of the adjustment burdens of maintairnng the peg. Such mechanisms are found in the EMS and figure in some proposals for tam'get zones and for fixed exchange rates. Many support the proposal for a European Central Bank for just this reason. The alternative is to sacrifice monetary sovereignty to maintain a flxed exchange rate and to follow the monetary policy of a major trading partner.
Under floating exchange rates, a rapid depreciation in the nominal exchange rate imi response to such inflationary policies signals the market's displeasure and constrains governments. Through collusion to fix the exchange rate, however, governments can ternpomarily blunt the exchange rate reaction to their policies and reduce the political costs of pursuing inflationary policies. Coordimiation to limit exchange mate fluctuations is politically attractive because it eliminates an important, immediate barometer of the market's opinion of government policies.
For their part, centnal banks often are willing participants, viewing exchange rate management as a legitimate aitn of monetary policy. Exchange rate mnovememits can impart useful information for policymaking, and as already noted, exchange rate targets can sonnetimes he consistent with a monetary policy of price stability. As often as not, however, exchange rate policies conflict with price stability. For example, U.S. put-chases of foreign curremicies in 1990 seemed inconsis-tent with a goal of price stability. When these objectives conflict, the Federal Reserve System is torn between its independence amid its accountability to the broad national policy goals set by Comigress and the Admniniistratiomi. The Federal Reserve does not wish to appear to the public as unresponsive to the objectives of Congress and the administration. Participation also enables a central bank to imifluence policy formulations that it is powerless to prevent. Such reasoning is a certain sign of a central bank unsure of its objective and insecure about its independence.
In countries with independent central banks, intervention policies might enable fiscal agents to extend their influence beyond the foreign exchange niarket to domestic monetary policy. Elected officials often seek more stimulative monetary policies than do cemitral banks, hoping to lower nominal interest rates and to stimulate real gi-owth and employment. In choosing a nominal exchange-rate target, intervening and encouraging the central batik not to sterilize the intervention, fiscal agents have a mechanism for such influence that would usually riot he open. At timnes, however, such as when the centmal bank policy conimittee is not in unanimous agreement, such an influence, marginal though it may be, could pmove decisive in charting future monetary policy actions.
INTEGRATED MARKETS AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS
I have attempted to instill a healthy skepticism for exchange market manipulation, arguing that it is a form of monetary protectionism that harms economic welfare. Monetary protectionism stems as a near-term palliative from the political interactions between policymakers and constituencies with vested interests in particular market outcomes. Any international monetary order willing to accept nonmarket criteria for exchange rates and failing to bind governments with a price-stability objective is ripe for monetary protectionism. To counter the political incentives toward monetary protectionism, nations should adopt monetary mandates, such as the Neal Resolution in the United States, that focus monetary policy on achieving and maintaining long-tenm price stability." 'rhis would do more to eliminate exchange market uncertainty and foster the efficient worldwide use of real "See Vaubel (1986) "See Hoskins (1990) .
resources than mimi~' pmogrann to manipulate miommunal exchange rates.
My comments are riot meant as a blanket condemnnation of imiternational policy cooperation. I strongly support cooperation that mnakes price stability the dominant objective amid mecogmnzes market-determnined exchange rates. Only cooperation based on these comiditions seems both feasible amid credible because it recognizes that nations want monetary sover~eigntyand will pursue diflerent economic policy objectives.
Comitr-ar to what some mnight infer, tlns approach does not preclude European monetar unnfication in the future, hut it suggests a different appn~oach than curn-entlv seems to he favored. European govermimiients are not likely to relinquish national monetary sovereignty on adoption of a single market -Consequently, greater exchange rate flexibility than the EMS currently pmovides seems necessary to ensure that exchange mates do miot interfere with the efficient flow of goods, lahom' and capital following the removal of restrictions. The free flow of resources, if it occurs, will foster a convergemice of policy pm-efem-enices within Europe as goverrunemits compete for these resources by providing stable economic and political environments. Governmnents that fail to provide such an environment will lose resources as markets vote omi policies. The resulting convergence of nmiomietary and fiscal policies will lead to greater exchange i-ate stability. If in time, governmemital competition for resources attaimis a convergence of macm-oecononnc policy, issues of national policy sovereigmity will he muted. Only then will nnonetarv umiiomi augmenl the efficiency gains of a single niam-ket. As seems obvious from r-ecent developments in Europe, efforts to rush monetary union mu-c effom-ts that put the cart before the horse amid may well interfere with the progress toward a single market.
'to fix exchange rates before a convergence of policy preferences within the European Economic Cornmnurnty seenis to ensnmre that interest rates and pr-ices will hear more of the adjustment burden. Mom-coven-, judging from the experiemice of Bretton Woods, fixed exchange rates would seemn to guarantee speculators periodic exchange i-ate adjustments and to encourage govermiments to impede the flow of goods amid capital through the m-eintroduction of restraints. The dynannics of achieving monetar-y union are as important as the goal, and piice stability is a more important goal than either.
Scones of new natiomis are busy constructing central banks to implement mnonetam-y policy. Using history as a guide, these miew cenitnai bamiks will try to pursue objectives other than piice stability, especially since thes' are being coumiseled by cemitral hankers with weak records on price stability. Short-term political agendas will likely dominate their policy actions and push them away fromn the pursuit of price stability. Yet it seems that there are powerful market forces that will crimp the effom'ts of central banks to misnnanage their currencies.
'I'he integration of world mnarkets, particularly financial markets, is limiting the degree to which pohcymnakers are willing to drift away froni price stability, at least for the major economies. Twenty years ago the Fedem-al Reserve paid scant attention to the effect of foreign rnai-kets on the price of U.S. govem'nnient securities amid iritemest mates in the United States. Yet when I participated in FOMC deliberations, we almost always discussed the effect of a policy' action on long-term Treasun-y n~ates,cul-m-ency values or the shape of the yield curve. The FOMC now looks at how tt'om-ld financial nnarkets assess the credibility of its policy actions with respect to inflation expectations. This process, in effect, limits the degmee to which the FOMC is willing to risk inflationary policy actions.
In Ermrope, smaller countries often peg their curi-encies to the Gem'man mnark, allowing the Bumideshank to determine their monetary Policies. The Germami central hank is also limited by world markets in ternis of the inflation path it chooses to pursue. I am not so hold as to aigue that miiarkets will cause central banks to wither away to agemicies that siniph' 1 )rniip out monetary growth rates that provide price stability.
It does seem to me, however, that market forces are stn'engthening the hand of central banks in fighting political pressures for short-term "quick fixes" to economic problems. Perhaps even politicians will learn the limits of goven-nments in solving economic problems.
If this view proves incorrect, central banks will face the prospect of mmu~ketparticipants developing private money to a much greater degree than exists today. When government management of paiticulam institutions results in failume, private-sector-alternatives appearwitness the privatization trend imi U.S. schools and coum'ts. Pemliaps those who eam'n to revisit the Scottish system of free banking may live to seeaversion of it replace central banking. If so, we are likely to pa~'a heavy price along the way.
Gcorg Rich
Georg Rich /8 a director and the deputy head of Department I at the Swiss National Bank.
Commentary
EE HOSKINS HAS WRITTEN a fine paper ott ruonetarv policy. I share most of his views On the role arid duties of central banks. I loskins discusses why the conduct of monetary policy has been entrusted to central banks. He also examines the conditions that nimmst he satisfied for central banks to play an effective policy role.
Hoskins' l)Iilicipal thesis is that cemitral banks are needed to manage a standard based on fiat miionev. But a fiat stamidard imposes few constraints on central banks. If central banks~ue pemmnil led to issue fiat mnomwv, there is always the m-isk that they will abuse their powers. Consequenth', under a fiat standam-d it is necessary to ensum-e that central banks act in the public interest.
Why rIo central banks frequemith' harm the public interest by debasing the currency? Hoskins discusses several possible reasons. lIe dismisses the answei-s offered by public-choice economists and also rejects the notion that unsatisfactory performamic of centi-al b uiks is due to the pursuit of inappropriate targets om-operating procedures. Instead, lie main tainis that ''cemitmal bankers are suffem'ing fm'om a Kevmesian hangover-.'' Fm-equenth' they do not dit-ect monetary policy solely at price stability' but attempt to prmrsue multiple objectives that often conflict. Phan~' cemitral bankers attempt to achieve at least two goals-to keep prices stable and to sniooth cyclical fluctuations in output and emnplovmnent . 'too often, iloskins maintains, central bankers also tr to manipulate the exchange rate with a view to strengthening the comnpetitive position of domnestic industry. Of course they do not pursue rnul I iple objectives because of a character defect. 'l'liev mnerel i'eflect prevailing opinions held by politicians, bankers, economnist sand othem-members of the general lJLll)lic.
In Iloskins' \'ie\\', the performance of central banks could he much improved if they were granted independence fronn govem-nmnemits and given a single objective-price stability. 'the celltral banks-thonmgb independent-would not lie allowed IC) choose policy objectives but would he given a cI cai' legislative mandate to achieve and main lain pm-ice stability. Moreover, they would he ac-countable to the public for theim The SNB's informal mandate explains why the inflation rate in Switzerland has tended to be low by international standards. Since the beginning of 1975-when Switzerland shifted to money stock targeting-inflation in Switzerland has averaged 3.5%. This average, however, still far exceeds the SNB's stated inflation target of 0 percent to 1 percent. Consequently, the SNB has failed to achieve pricestabilitydespite the informal mandate. The SNB's failure to meet its stated target results largely from two short episodes of accelerating inflation. From 1979 to 1981 and from 1989 to 1991, Swiss inflation temporarily rose to more than 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
NEED FOR OPERATIONAL RULES
The SNWs failure to achieve price stability did not reflect a Keynesian hangover. Rather, the SNB encountered various problems when it attempted to translate its price-stability mandate into suitable operational policy rules. The need for operational rules arises because monetary policy affects the inflation rate with a long and frequently variable lag. In Switzerland the time lag may be as much as threeyears. Therefore monetary policy decisions do not affect the inflation rate until long after they are implemented. Because of the lag, such decisions invariably entail a great deal of uncertainty. Central banks may err even if they try to adhere closely to their mandate. Once they recognize their mistakes, it is usually too late to take corrective action.
To lower the danger of policy blunders, central banks require reliable early warning signals or leading indicators of inflation. Operational rules centered on these leading indicators give central banks a good chance of accomplishing a goal of achieving and maintaining price stability.
Do central banks possess reliable leading indicators of inflation?
This question cannot be answered straightforwardly. Monetarists tend to emphasize the close relationship between money growth and the inflation rate. They maintain that the money stock serves as a good leading indicator of price movements. Therefore central banks are likely to meet the price-stability objecthe if they adopt an operational rule providing for steady growth in the money supply.
Most central banks today share the monetarist view that inflation is due largely to excessive money growth. Nonetheless, they hesitate to opt for strategies of steady money growth. The SNB is no exception. En Switzerland the growth in both the monetary base and the money stock Ml tend to lead inflation. Therefore the SNB focuses attention on these two aggregates and sets an intermediate target for the Swiss monetary base. It strives to increase the monetary base at a rate of 1 percent per year. The SNB views this target as consistent with price stability in the medium and long runs.
Although the SNB follows a money-growth rule, it need not augment the monetary base by 1 percent year after year. Depending on the circumstances, it may temporarily undershoot or overshoot the 1 percent target. For this reason, the SNB frames its money-growth rule in terms of a medium-range target, to be met on the average of a five-year period. Temporary deviations from the 1 percent growth path may be required if serious unexpected shocks hit the Swiss economy. Two kinds of shocks may prompt the SNB to deviate: unexpected shifts in money demand and other unexpected shocks such as excessive movements in the exchange rate.
SHIFTS IN MONEY DEMAND
,\ strategy of steady money growth is effective only if money demand is stable. In contrast to many other countries, Switzerland has been blessed with reasonably stable money-demand patterns. But this does not imply that instabihties have not occurred. Serious instabilities arose in the late 1 980s as a result of two Financial innovations A new electronic interbank payments system and a major overhaul of liquidity requirements, or minimum reserve requirements, imposed on banks caused a huge liernianent drop in the demand for base money. Much of that decline occurred in the first half of 1988, but stability was riot restored until about 1990 or 1991.
It is clear that central banks must adjust the money supply to permanent demand shifts or long-lasting temporary demand shifts if the\' are to keep the price level stable. It is not always advisable to react quickly to demand shifts, however. Money demand is subject to frequent transitory movements that do not call for a central-hank response. Moreover, demand shifts are hard to detect. They often become fully apparent only after considerable time has elapsed. For these reasons, Meltzer (1987) and McCallum (1989, Ch. 16 ) recommend a slow reaction pattern. They propose mechanical rules that would prompt central banks to adjust the money supply gradually to demand shifts. I support Meltzer and McCallum's call for a gradual response, hut 1 doubt that central banks should be committed to a mechanical reaction pattern. The speed of the response is likely to depend on the nature of these shifts. For example, if central banks know in advance that a major shift will occur, they should adjust the money supply quickly.
Confronted with the demand shift of the late 1980s, the SNB opted for caution. SNB officials knew that a shift would occur but did not know how big the shift would be or how fast base-money demand would fall. As a result of the SNB's cautious response, short-term domestic interest rates fell sharply at the beginning of 1988 but rose again as the SNB gradually lowered the supply of base money. By summer 1988, shortterm domestic interest rates returned to their pre-shift levels. Long-term rates, however, did not budge. Thus market participants correctly regarded the fall in short-term interest rates as transitory.
With hindsight, various students of Swiss monetary policy attribute the most recent surge in the Swiss inflation rate to the SNB's cautious reaction to the demand shift. The SNtI, they assert, should have acted more aggressively. The SNB's cautious response no doubt was equivalent to a temporary easing of monetary policy. Nonetheless, it cannot be regarded as the main cause of the rise in inflation. I am not aware of any economic theory able to explain how six months of easy money, which the market correctly regarded as transitory, could have generated three~'ears of high inflation. For this reason, I still maintain that central banks should react cautiously to shifts in money demand.
OTHER UNEXPECTED SHOCKS
Similar problems arise from other unexpected shocks that may impinge on the central banks' anti-inflationar monetary policies. In small countries like Switzerland, central banks are frequently compelled to take the real exchange rate into account when setting monetary policy. Real exchange i-ate movements often fail to reflect economic fundamentals. As 1 pointed out before, Swiss inflation picked up temporarily in the early 1980s and early 1990s. Although the SNB attempted to keep the monetary base on a growth path consistent with medium-run price stability, the Swiss franc weakened sharply in real terms during both periods of high inflation; that is, the depreciation was much larger than would have been expected on the basis of inflation differentials between Switzerland and other countries. Therefore the exchange-rate depreciation reinforced the inflationary pressures in Switzerland. 'the SNB reacted to this situation by tightening monetary policy. As a result, the monetaiy base fell below the medium-run growth path. The tightening of the monetary reins eventually caused the Swiss franc to appreciate again. In this way, the SNB counteracted the inflationary pressures emanating from the exchange rate. Lee Hoskins takes a dim view of central-bank attempts to manipulate the exchange rate. However, he considers only central-bank efforts to stimulate domestic employment by means of an exchange-rate depreciation. Such policies, I agree, may be inconsistent with the mandate to achieve and maintain price stability. But we should not overlook the situations in which exchange-rate movements undermine central banks' antiinflationary policy stances.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOtUS
Nevertheless, Hoskins' objections to exchangerate policy aie often valid. Exchange-rate policy may or may not he consistent with p1-ice stability. Swiss experience offers examples of both types of exchange-rate policy. The SNB did mnore than try to counteract excessive real depreciations of the Swiss franc. In 1978 and 1987 it reacted to an excessive real appreciation by relaxing monetary policy.
Although the real appreciation supported the fight against inflation, the SNR tried to halt or even revet-se the upward movement in the exchange rate. The SNB thought that its efforts to curb the appreciation of the Swiss franc yei~e consistent with its mandate to stabilize the price level. In 1978 and 1987 inflation was low and declining. In principle it followed an operational sti-ategy of gradually lowering the inflation rate. In its view a gradual approach would minimize the real costs of achieving and maintaining price stability. Considering its preference for gradualism, the SNB did not welcome the real appreciation of the Swiss franc because it affected the domestic economy in the same way an unnecessary tightening of monetaj-y policy would. Therefore the SNB allowed money growth to rise temporarily above the level consistent with medium-run price stability.
Unfortunately, the SNB's strategy of adjusting money growth to the real appreciation of the Swiss franc turned out to conflict with the price-stability objective. In both periods inflation rose again in due course. The two short episodes of rising inflation are largely explained by the SNB's efforts to counteract an excessive real appreciation of the Swiss franc.
Thus Swiss experience lends at least partial support to Fioskins' objections to excliai~ge~,-rate policy. However, strict compliance with a pricestability mandate need not imply that central banks should abstain totally from manipulating the exchange rate. Even if the SNB tried to rule out any risks of erring on the side of inflation, it could not afford to ignore real exchange rate movements entirely. Instead it had to react asymmetrically. With an excessive i-cal appreciation of the Swiss franc, the, SNB would keep the monetai-t' base on the medium-run growth path.
Faced with an excessive real depreciation, on the other hand, it would push the monetary base below that path. The resulting policy might he closer to shock therapy than to gradualism. The i-cal costs of the shock therapy would constitute the price the SNB would have to pay for playing it safe.
In practice, I doubt that central banks are able to disregard entirely the real costs of eliminating inflation. The SNB has repeatedly emphasized that it cannot stabilize the price level without accepting a temporary increase in unemployment. But the Swiss pubhc also expects the SNB to keep the real costs of its anti-inflationary monetars' policy as low as possible. Therefore the SNB, in pi-inciple, must follow a gradualist approach. We cou]d probably improve our performance if in the future we display greater r-eluctance to react to excessive real appreciations of the Swiss franc than we have in the past.
CONCLUSIONS
Let me conclude by emphasizing again that I agree with the thrust of Floskins' reasoning. Monetary policy should be entrusted to independent central banks with a clear legislative mandate to achieve and maintain price stability. But in my view, independence and a clear mandate are not sufficient to guarantee a good monetary policy performance. It is also important that central banks adopt opem-ational policy rules consistent with their mandate. Although central banks should be free to choose appmopmiate operational rules, they should be commnitted to spell out explicitly how they intend to fulfill their mandates. In particular, they should state how they intend to respond to shifts in money demand and other unexpected disturbances.
